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THE ARIZONA LABOR DECISION
In Truax v. Corrigan (1921) 4 2 Sup. Ct. 124, the Court held uncon-
stitutional an Arizona Statute limiting the use of injunctions in labor
disputes. So many and so important are the questions raised by this
case that it is possible within the limits of a short discussion to call
attention to some of the more important issues only.
The case is thrown into sharper relief by the decision of the same
Court only two weeks earlier in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Trades Council (1921) 42 Sup. Ct. 72, upholding the almost identical
provisions of the Clayton Act.- The decision in the principal case is
'Act of Oct. 15, 1914 (38 Stat. at L. 73o, 738).
There is one distinction important on the point of due process between the
Arizona Statute (Ariz. Civil Code, 1913, par. 1464) and the Clayton Act, supra, for
the latter has the provision, not contained in the former: "nor shall any of the
acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law
of the United States." Sec. 2o. The Clayton Act was construed in Duplex Co.
v. Deering (1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct 172. Similar statutes exist in other
states. Wash. Laws, I919, ch. 185; Or. Laws, i919, ch. 346 , upheld in Green-
[408]
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made to rest upon the construction given the Arizona Statute by the
Arizona Supreme Court. In discussing the case our interest must
necessarily center about the majority opinion of Chief justice Taft, but
mention should be made of the three noteworthy dissenting opinions.
Justice Holmes again calls attention to the dangers of a "delusive
exactness" in the application of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
need of "social experiments" in "the insulated chambers afforded by
the several states, even though the experiments may seem futile or
even noxious" to us; Justice Pitney, with whom concurred Justice
Clarke, states clearly and concisely the issue between majority and
minority as to the equal protection of the laws; while Justice Brandeis
presents a veritable treatise upon the rules of law applicable to disputes
between employer and employee in England, in the British Dominions,
and in this country.
The Arizona Statute in effect prohibited the issuance of an injunction
in a labor dispute "unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to
property or to a property right" for which injury there was no adequate
remedy at law; and it further provided that any injunction issued
should not prohibit various acts, including "recommending, advising or
persuading others by peaceful means" to cease from working or from
patronizing or employing any party to a labor dispute. The plaintiffs
brought an action for injunctive relief alleging that the defendants
were insolvent and unable to respond in damages and that the plaintiffs
had no other speedy, adequate remedy, and setting forth certain acts
committed by the defendants during the course of a strike against the
plaintiffs concerning terms of employment in an endeavor to drive
patronage away from the plaintiffs' restaurant. After a trial on the
facts judgment was given for the defendants, and this judgment was
affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court.2 The plaintiffs then com-
menced another action against slightly different defendants, alleging
the same acts and again asking for an injunction. The complaint was
field v. Central Labor Council (1920, Or.) 192 Pac. 783. See also Okla. Rev.
Laws, 191o, sec. 3764, upheld in State v. Coyle (1912) 7 Okla. Cr. 50, 122 Pac.
243; Ex parte Schweitzer (1917) 13 Okla. Cr. 154, 162 Pac. 1134. 'In the
comments on Present Day Labor Litigation (COMMENTS (1921) 30 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 280, 404, 501, 618, 736; 31 ibid. 86) it was pointed out that while the
majority rule is that "peaceful picketing" is not unlawful, a minority hold
otherwise, and that statutes legalizing peaceful picketing are open to difficulties of
definition. 30 ibid. 405, 738. Chief Justice Taft in the American Steel Foundries
Case and in the principal case states that peaceful picketing is a contradiction in
terms which both the Clayton Act and the Arizona Statutes sedulously avoid, but
in the former case he held that peaceful persuasion by a single union representa-
tive stationed at each entrance to the employer's plant was permissible. But in
the principal case Justice Brandeis states that the Court in the former case held
peaceful picketing not unlawful. The difference is at least largely one of defini-
tion.
'Truax v. Bisbee Local No. 38o (1918) 19 Ariz. 379, 171 Pac. 121.
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demurred to, the Court sustained the demurrer and rendered judgment
for the defendants. This judgment was sustained by the Arizona
Supreme Court.3 It is this judgment which the Federal Supreme Court
now reverses.
The acts complained of by the plaintiffs consisted in part of patrolling
in front of the plaintiffs' restaurant with banners and loud appeals,
making libellous charges concerning one of the plaintiffs and applying
abusive epithets to him, disparaging the service rendered in the res-
taurant and the character of its patrons, and making threats of injury
against would-be patrons. The allegations of the complaint set forth
a very drastic form of campaign upon the part of the defendants which
could hardly be termed "peaceful." But the Arizona Court held that
it was not shown not to have been peaceful, apparently because there
was an absence of direct physical force and violence.
The opinion of Chief Justice Taft is divided into two parts; a dis-
cussion of the guaranty of due process of law, and a discussion of the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws, each given by the Four-
teenth Amendment.4 As to the first guaranty, the discussion proceeds
on familiar lines that the business of the plaintiffs is a property right,
and that to hold they are "remediless" where their business has been
thus largely destroyed is to deny them due process. With the statements
made in this part of the opinion it seems there may be rather general
agreement.5 One perhaps might suggest that the Court, in view of
decisions such as those sustaining the Arizona Employers' Liability Act
and the New York Rent Law,' should attempt to state how far under
the police power the relation of employer and employee may be sub-
jected to peculiar regulation by a state legislature.7  The question of
the constitutionality of the Kansas Industrial Court may call forth such
a discussion." In any event it seems probable that as yet at least the
state legislatures cannot render remediless such injuries as those the
plaintiffs are alleged to have received.
But it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the decision of this case
cannot and is not made to depend upon this part of the Court's opinion.
For the Statute deals only with the matter of injunctions9 and the
3 Triax v. Corrigan (1918) 20 Ariz. 7, 176 Pac. 570.
' The words of the Amendment are given in COMMENTS, infra, at p. 422.5 An interesting subordinate question is how far the federal court is bound by
the lower court's finding of facts or interpretation of facts. The Supreme Court
seems correct, on principle and on the authority cited, that no constitutional ques-
tion should depend upon the shadowy distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact See Isaacs, The Law and the Facts (1922) 22 COL. L. R.v. i.
'Arizona Enployers' Liability Cases (1919) 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct 553;
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (1921) 41 Sup. Ct 465; Block v. Hirsh
(1921) 41 Sup. Ct 458.
'See a suggestive note in (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 78.'
'See COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 75.
' See supra note i. The Statute discussed in Ex parte Schweitzer, supra note i,
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Arizona Court, whatever it may have said, had before it only a cause of
action for injunctive relief.10 Chief justice Taft applies the due
process clause only to the making "remediless" the injury to the plain-
tiffs, and says that if the opinion of the Arizona Court "does not with-
hold from the plaintiffs all remedy for the wrongs they suffered, but
only the equitable relief of injunction, there still remains the question
whether they are thus denied the equal protection of the laws." Again,
he says that "it is beside the point to say that plaintiffs had no vested
right in equity relief, and that taking it away does not deprive them of
due process of law," for "this does not meet the objection under the
equality clause." The decision, therefore, turns entirely upon this
latter guaranty, and any reference to the due process clause can only be
dictum. The Court does not attempt to put its decision upon the very
questionable ground that anyone has a vested interest in a particular
kind of remedy.""
The effect of this equality guaranty may be considered from two
angles: first, does the guaranty require that the plaintiff should here
be accorded a primary right to some relief ; and second, if that question
is answered in the affirmative, must that relief be that of injunction?
As to the first, the Chief Justice states that the guaranty was intended
to secure equality of protection not only for all but against all similarl3x
situated; and he emphasizes the unequal privileges given the defend-
ants, "the distinction here between the ex-employees and other tort-
feasors," the "classification based on the relation of an employer, not
to an employee, but to one who has ceased to be so, in respect of torts
thereafter committed by such ex-employee," the fact that if competing
restaurant keepers "had inaugurated such a campaign," "an injunction
would necessarily have issued," and generally- the lack of equality
between the defendants and other wrongdoers.12 Justice Pitney here
takes issue squarely, stating that undue favoritism to the defendants is
not discrimination against the plaintiffs, of which discrimination alone
is more drastic than the Clayton Act which as shown above is more drastic than the
Arizona Act since the latter applies only to the form of remedy, while the others
attempt also to define the primary rights of the parties.
"WVhile certain statements of the Arizona Court are broad, it would seem that
when it is said that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, the words "for injunc-
tive relief" should be supplied. This is borne out by the statement in the first
case that a person attacked by a wrongful speech or writing, "if injured," may
recover damages, which is a complete remedy, and equity may not be invoked
because of the financial irresponsibility of the plaintiffs and the great number of
suits made necessary. See ig Ariz. at p. 394, 171 Pac. at p.: i7.
See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Cole (1919) 251 U. S. 54, 40 Sup. Ct. 68
(citing cases).
"It seems scarcely correct to classify employees striking as to terms and condi-
tions of employment as "ex-employees" especially in view of the holding in the
Anterican Steel Found ries Case that a labor union as a whole was entitled to be
considered an interested party in a strike.
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they can complain, that it is as to the plaintiffs no more than a failure to
include in the general law a case which for the sake of consistency
ought to have been covered, and that to disregard this rule is to trans-
form the equality guaranty into an "insistence upon laws complete,
perfect, symmetrical."
Upon this point it is submitted with all deference that Justice Pitney
is clearly right and that he is borne out by both the history of the
Amendment and the history of its enforcement. It was passed after
the Civil War in order to place all people on an equality of rights, to
prevent a state from discrininating against anyone, but not to require
absolute uniformity of law.'8  And it has been construed, in the cases
cited by the Chief Justice as well as in others, to permit attacks on state
laws only by those who are discriminated against.14  If A has a right
against X, B must have a similar right against X, unless differen-
tiated by a proper and reasonable classification. But if B has a right
against X, he cannot thereby claim that he must have a similar right
against Y or object because Y may be privileged where X is not. Such'
a complaint can only be made by X. So here if the defendants are
unfairly privileged as against competing employers, it is for the latter
alone to complain. 5
13 "It (the Amendment) was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoy-
ment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and
to give to that race the protection of the general government, in that enjoyment,
whenever it should be denied by the states." Strauder v. West Virginia (i88o)
IOO U. S. 303. Mr. justice Miller's doubt in The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873,
U. S.) 16 Wall.. 36, whether any state action not a discrimination against the
negroes would ever be held to come within the purview of the equality provision
has, of course, not been substantiated. For a case where the equality clause
should properly apply see Comm NTs, infra, at p. 422.
4 The usual rule that only one injured by a statute can question its constitu-
tionality (12 C. J. 76o) applies here, so that only one discriminated against by a
statute may question it as denying the equal protection of the laws. Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases (IgIg) 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct 553; Jeffrey Mfg.
Co. v. Blagg (1915) 235 U. S. 571, 35 Sup. Ct 167; Hendrick v. Maryland (1915)
235 U. S. 61o, 35 Sup. Ct 140; Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright (1912) 225
U. S. 540, 32 Sup. Ct. 784; State v. Case (1918) 132 Md. 269, 103 At. 569. See
many cases collected, 12 C. J. 768, 769; 32 L. R. A. (N. s.) 954, note. In the case
much relied on by the Court, where an anti-trust act was held invalid because of
provisions excepting agricultural products and live stock in the hands of the
producer or raiser, the question was raised by one upon whom the unequal duty
was placed. Connolly v. The Union Sewer Pipe Company (19o2) 184 U. S. 540,
22 Sup. Ct 431. The oft-quoted statement in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) I18
U. S. 356, 359, 6 Sup. Ct 1O64, that "the equal protection of the laws is a pledge
of equal laws" seems to mean little, but it does put an unfortunate emphasis upon
equality in the law itself rather than equality in the protection granted.
5 Thus in the case cited of Bogni v. Perotti (1916) 224 Mass. 152, 112 N. E.
853, which perhaps is the nearest in support of the principal case and is by
a court most drastic in its attitude towards labor, it is carefully pointed out that
a denial of injunctive relief is a discrimination against another laborer who does
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If the equality clause is thus construed, the effect is to shift the
emphasis from the situation of the defendants to that of the plaintiffs.
It is not important then that these "tort-feasors" may be unwisely
privileged; the question is whether plaintiffs are denied rights which
others similarly situated have. And as plaintiffs have such right as all
other employers have, the question is therefore entirely one of the rea-
sonableness of the classification which puts employers into a separate
group from other plaintiffs. No cumulative weight against the Statute
may be piled up because the plaintiffs' competitors are harmed or the
defendants are privileged; the case is purely whether the classifiation
made is so unreasonable as to deny plaintiffs rights which those similarly
situated enjoy.
As to the reasonableness of the classification a glance at arty annota-
tions of the digested cases construing the equality clause is highly sug-
gestive. Here appear cases almost without number sustaining a vast
variety of classifications-employers and employees under workmen's
compensation and employers' liability acts, employers and employees in
particular occupations and businesses (such as those in railroad res-
taurants distinguished from those in all other restaurants,38 ) retailers
who are making bulk sales, those who would use the national flag in
advertising, junk-dealers, doctors or undertakers distinguished from
other humans, and so on in almost endless combinations' 7-- while inter-
spersed are only a comparatively few where the classifications attempted
have been held unreasonable.' 8 With this as a background should be
considered "the state of the art"'" as shown in Justice Brandeis' com-
not come within the terms of the statute and that as to such laborer, the validity
of the statute may be attacked. The plaintiffs there were such other laborers." Dominion Hotel v. Arizona (igi8) 249 U. S. 265, 39 Sup. Ct 273.
"IN. Y. Central Ry. v. White (1917) 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct 247; Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases (1919) 250 U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553; Lamieux v.
Young (9o9) 211 U. S. 489, 29 Sup. Ct 174; Halter v. Nebraska (1907) 205
U. S. 34, 27 Sup. Ct 419; Rosenthal v. New York (1912) 226 U. S. 260, 33 Sup.
Ct 27; Collins v. Texas (1912) 223 U. S. 288, 32 Sup. Ct 286; Keller v. State
(1914) 122 Md. 677, 90 Atl. 603. See ii U. S. Comp. Sts. Ann. E916, 14817 et
seq.; 2 ibid. Supplement, 1919, 2655 et seq.
The effect of some of these at least has been weakened by later decisions. Cf.
Connelly v. Union Sewer Pipe Line Company, supra note 14, with Carroll v.
Greenwich Ins. Co. (igo5) 199 U. S. 401, 26 Sup. Ct 66, and Otis v. Parker
(19o3) 187 U. S. 6o6, 23 Sup. Ct 168; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis (1897) 165
U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct 255 (attorneys' fees on small claims against a railroad)
with Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Matthews (1899) 174 U. S. 96, 19 Sup. Ct 6o,
and Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers (1907) 207 U. S. 73, 28 Sup. Ct 28; and
Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. (igoi) 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct 30, with
St. Louis Consol. Coal Co. v. Illinois (1902) 185 U. S. 203, 22 Sup. Ct. 616, and
McLean v. Kansas (1909) 211 U. S. 539, 29 Sup. Ct. 206.
'Cf. Muller v. Oregon (19o8) 2o8 U. S. 412, 28 Sup. Ct 324, saying that in
patent cases counsel usually open by discussing the state of the art, and referring
to Mr. Brandeis' brief then before the Court which collected authorities showing
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prehensive survey of the views of courts and legislatures on this prob-
lem, demonstrating a widely-held belief that the relation of employers to
their employees deserves and requires special treatment.20 Finally should
be considered the well-settled rule that the act must be sustained unless
the classification is clearly unreasonable. 2 1  It is hard to follow the
Court to its conclusion that this classification is clearly unreasonable.
The decision is regrettable.
As to the necessity of granting the remedy of injunction, Justice
Brandeis again collects authority to show the discretionary character of
this particular form of remedy. He shows that it is refused where there
is an adequate remedy at law, and also in cases of contracts for personal
service, of actionable libels, of mere political rights, where the opera-
tions of the police department are involved, in cases of nuisance where
the doctrine of balance of convenience or comparative equities obtains,
where a remedy is expressly given for a statutory right, and where Con-
gress has prohibited the use of injunctions as in the matters of pro-
ceedings in state courts, and the illegal assessment and collection of
taxes.
Many people, including some good lawyers, have felt that the injunc-
tion was not a proper remedy for a labor dispute. It has not been long
used in this country in such disputes and in England it is infrequently
employed, resort being had to the criminal law or to actions for dam-
ages.2 2  However much we may be convinced of its value, it does not
seem a necessity to the adjustment of labor difficulties. One may
regret, therefore, that an experiment along the lines advocated by so
many persons which was to be tried in a limited way in Arizona and
the course of legislation upon hours of labor for women, the question then .at
issue.
'o Chief Justice Taft suggests that it is a far cry from the classification of
employer and employee under workmen's compensation acts to the classification in
the principal case. But before the former acts became so familiar to us, which
would have seemed the greater step, to impose upon a class "liability without
fault" or to deny certain persons in certain cases the equitable remedy of injunc-
tion? Cf. Justice McKenna and Justice McReynolds dissenting in Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases, supra note 14. COMMENTS (1919) 29 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 225. Again the Chief Justice says as to classification: "When funda-
mental rights are thus attempted to be taken away, however, we may well subject
such experiment to attentive judgment." But this "attentive judgment" should be
only to determine the existence of a reasonable distinction between those included
and those excluded from the operation of the Statute, not to pass on legislative
policies. Earlier the Chief Justice seems, impliedly at least, to have admitted
that an injunction is not a fundamental right.
Dominion Hotel v. Arizona (1919) 249 U. S. 265, 268, 39 Sup. Ct. 273, 274.
' See authorities collected by Justice Brandeis, who points out that the injunc-
tion did not secure recognition as a remedy in labor disputes in this country until
1888. See also Gregory, Governmett by Injunction (1898) II HARV. L. REv. 487,
and statement by Mr. Frank Morrison in 1921 quoted in COMENTS (1921) 3
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 86.
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other states has thus been prevented, just as one would regret if the
Kansas experiment of the industrial court should be prematurely
snuffed out.2
3
A final question is as to the effect of the decision. The case is
remanded for the issuance of an injunction if the facts alleged are
proved.2' It appears that the real difference between the State and the
Federal 'Courts is as to the interpretation of the facts-the application
of the Statute to the facts. Had the Arizona Court held the defendants'
acts to have been not peaceful, the Statute would not have applied.
The Supreme Court distinguishes its support of the Clayton Act in the
Anerican Steel Foundries Case from this case on the ground not only
that there is no requirement of equality as to Congressional action, but
also because of the construction of this Statute made by the State Court.
By this construction the Federal Court is bound. 25 But in view of the
usual rule as to the effect of judgments, a decision of the unconstitu-
tionality of an act is only binding in the very case made and anyone
may raise the question again in another case.2 6 There is thus legally
no distinction between a decision as to a statute which appears fair on
its face but is unconstitutionally applied, and one not fair on its face.
In either case the decision only affects the situation then before the
See supra note 8.
24 The Court's conclusion is that "if the evidence sustains the averments of the
complaint, an injunction should issue as prayed." But the injunction prayed for
was, according to the lower court, one "prohibiting the defendant from attending
at or near the plaintiffs' place of business for the purpose of peaceably communi-
cating the existence of a strike pending, and of peaceably persuading any person
from patronizing the plaintiffs, or from recommending, advising, or persuading
others so to do." 2o Ariz. at p. 9, 176 Pac. at p. 571. The Court had decided, in
spite of Justice Holmes' view to the contrary, that the invalidity of this Statute
did not render invalid the entire Statute giving the Arizona courts power to issue
injunctions. This point is not discussed herein. See Davis, Director General of
Railroads v. Wallace (Jan. 19, 1922) U. S. Sup. Ct, Oct. Term, 1921, No. 329.
' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911) 220 U. S. 61, 73, 31 Sup. Ct 337,
338; Hill v. Dockery (i9o3) 191 U. S. 165, 24 Sup. Ct 53. But there are state-
ments that the Supreme Court is not bound by the lower court's statement of the
meaning of the Statute. Yick Wo v. Hopkins supra, note 14; Atchison, T. &
S. F. Ry. v. Mathews (1899) 174 U. S. 96, ioo, ig Sup. Ct 6og, 611; Hodge
v. Muscatine County (1905) 196 U. S. 276, 25 Sup. Ct 237. Again a law fair on
"its face may be so improperly applied as to violate the Constitution. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, supra, note 14; Reagan v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. (1894) 154 U. S.
362, 390, 14 Sup. Ct. 1047, 1051. Cf. Pound, J., dissenting in People v. Doyle
(1921) 232 N. Y. 96, commented on in CURRENT D czsIoxs, infra at p. 45o. Any
apparent inconsistency here should, it seems, be reconciled by recognizing the rule
stated in the text that the decision of unconstitutionality binds only the parties to
the case and their privies, and hence applies only to the application of the Statute
made to the particular facts in issue.
'Middleton v. Texas, P. & L. Co. (1919) 249 U. S. 152, 39 Sup. Ct. 227;
Shephard v. Wheeling (1887) 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635; Rutten v. Paterson
(19o6) 73 N. J. L. 467, 64 At. 573; In re Wine (192o, Fla.) 83 So. 627.
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court. Practically, however, in the latter case, the matter will not again
be litigated, and the Statute may be treated as void.2 7 Hence we may
properly emphasize, as does the Supreme Court, that it is here definitely
the application of the Statute made by the State Court which is found
objectionable. There is no reason why the State Court may not on
another set of facts make its views conform to those now promulgated
as the law of the land.2 8  C.E.C.
FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS
Foreign exchange transactions have become of novel importance
during the last six years and a great amount of litigation has pro-
duced confused decisions. The war, the fluctuating rates of exchange,
and the apparent position of the United States as the world's bankers
have contributed to a situation that demands legal clarity and certainty.
A large part of the business of foreign exchange consists of selling
credits available at a foreign point to those who desire to make pay-
ments at that point. The purchaser of foreign exchange seldom buys
currency; he buys credit, a chose in action, made available abroad by
an agent or correspondent of the seller. The draft which may be
delivered to the purchaser is only a piece of paper evidencing the trans-
action; the message which may be sent to the seller's correspondent
by mail or by cable is merely part of the mechanics of making the
credit available.' The actual money paid by the purchaser is not
transmitted to the foreign point. It becomes the seller's property and
he does not hold it as trustee or agent until the payment of the credit
is effected.2
The transactions are of various forms, each governed to a large
extent by the terms of a special contract. In the case of a draft pay-
able in a foreign country, the seller draws an order on his correspond-
ent, warranting that it will be accepted and paid when presented at the
foreign point. The buyer is usually given the draft and undertakes
the duty and risk of forwarding it abroad by mail. The cable transfer
is a much faster method. The seller agrees to establish forthwith by
means of a cable message a credit in favor of a payee abroad designated
by the purchaser. The seller generally specifies in the contract that
he will not be responsible for errors or delays in the transmission of the
message unless caused by him. The seller of a cable transfer ordinarily
undertakes to notify the payee abroad, designated by the purchaser,"
that the credit has been established and may undertake to hand over
'Norton v. Shelby County (1886) 1iO U. S. 425, 6 Sup. Ct 112.' Middleton v. Texas, P. & L. Co., supra note 26.It seems clearly erroneous to consider the draft as the thing bought. But see
(1921) 35 HARv. L. RFv. 88.
'Legniti v. Mechanics & Metals National Bank (1921) 230 N. Y. 415, 130 N. E.
597.
